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1 CASE SUMMARY 
 
This case of HM Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services 
and Skills v The Interim Executive Board of Al-Hijrah School1 was the 
unfortunate outcome of an Office for Standards in Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills (Ofsted) inspection which resulted in a cataclysmic 
breakdown in trust between the government agency and the Birmingham 
city based Al-Hijrah school. Following an Ofsted inspection carried out 
under section 5 of the Education Act 2005, the subsequent Report stated 
that the full segregation of female and male pupils in a mixed-sex school 
amounted to sex discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. Al-Hijrah 
School applied to the High Court for a judicial review of the report prior 
to its official publication. The High Court Justice considered a range of 
evidences including facts related to Ofsted procedure, and ruled that the 
segregation did not amount to a breach of the 2010 Act, as when taken as 
a group, the treatment of the boys and the girls was the same and so there 
was an absence of “less favourable treatment”.  
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal who stated that the 
High Court’s approach to the question was incorrect and it was individual 
claimants’ rights which were to be construed, not that of the entire group 
of girls and the entire group of boys. Thus, the court must have regard to 
each individual pupil as separate from the group and comparator. So the 
question becomes whether the individual girl pupil was treated less 
favourably than a boy pupil as the boy pupil had the benefit of engaging 
with his boy peers while the girl pupil did not. Similarly, the boy pupil did 
not have the benefit of engaging with other girl pupils in the same way as 
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a girl pupil did. This discrimination was based on the protected 
characteristic of sex and was held to breach section 85(2) of the Equality 
Act 2010.  
Ofsted stated that the segregation impacted on the children’s 
education and development as both boys and girls lost the opportunity to 
socialise, interact and learn from engagement with the opposite sex. 
Ofsted further cited “British values” and the preparedness of these 
children for life in modern Britain. Ofsted additionally argued that the 
female students faced particular disadvantage as a result of the 
segregation, but this was rejected. A final appeal by the Association of 
Muslim Schools to be added to the action following the appeal judgment 
was rejected, thereby preventing an appeal to the Supreme Court.  
 
Keywords: Direct discrimination; Gender; Less favourable treatment; 
OFSTED; Protected characteristics; Segregation; Sex discrimination  
 
2 CASE HISTORY  
 
Ofsted carried out a section 5 inspection in 2016 and reported Al-
Hijrah school to be inadequate on three specific grounds: (i) Effectiveness 
of leadership and management, (ii) The personal development, behaviour 
and welfare of pupils, and (iii) Early years provision.2 
The lack of “effectiveness of leadership and management” was due to 
a number of issues including “the failure to have due regard to the duty to 
achieve equality of opportunity as required by s.149 of the 2010 Act; and 
ineffective arrangements for safeguarding.”3 The issue of segregation of 
pupils was raised as a core concern, with the Ofsted report stating that 
segregation “limits pupils’ social development, and the extent to which 
they are prepared for interaction with the opposite sex when they leave 
school.” 4  In response to the School’s claims of religious motivation, 
Ofsted was of the view that the school had no policies to actively mitigate 
the “potentially negative impact of this practice on pupils’ chances to 
develop into socially confident individuals with peers from the opposite 
gender.”5  
Al-Hijrah school applied for Judicial Review of Ofsted’s inspection 
report, and the High Court ruled that strict gender segregation between 
                                                     
2 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [18]. 
3 Ibid [19].  
4 Ibid [20].  
5 Ibid. 
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boys and girls aged 9-16 did not amount to unlawful discrimination 
contrary to the provisions of the Equalities Act 2010. The key issues for 
Judicial Review related to the following: whether the denial to both sexes 
of the opportunity to interact, socialise and learn with, or from, the 
opposite sex amounted to “less favourable treatment” for the purposes of 
the Equality Act 2010 s.13(1) read in conjunction with s.23(1); and 
secondly, whether the segregation was because girls were regarded as 
inferior to boys.6  
Mr Justice Jay’s judicial review treated the boys and girls at the 
school as two distinct groups, and in applying the provisions of the 
Equalities Act 2010, the treatment of both of these groups was compared. 
The Justice concluded that it could not be said that one group was being 
treated less favourably than the other giving rise to unfair advantage and 
therefore discrimination. In fact, both groups were being treated the same.  
Further, on the issue of a particular detriment to girls, the High Court 
rejected Ofsted’s argument that there was a particular and greater 
detriment suffered by girls due to the women being a group with “a 
minority of power” in society and the idea that segregation of girls 
“cannot be separated from deep-seated cultural and historical perspectives 
as to the inferiority of the female sex.”7 These were rejected on the basis 
that there is no evidence to support the assertion that segregation in a 
mixed school in fact has a greater impact on female pupils.8 This raises an 
interesting issue which underlies the entire premise of the arguments 
being put forward by Ofsted – the question of evidence of the detriment 
being suffered. “Ofsted’s view was that this restriction on freedom of a 
girl pupil to mix or socialise with boy pupils and on a boy pupil to mix 
and socialise with girl pupils was detrimental to their education.”9 Yet this 
detriment was probed by the High Court, but not a focus for the Court of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal stated that Ofsted is entitled to reach a 
finding that segregation has an adverse impact on the quality and 
effectiveness of the girls’ and boys’ education.10 
Ofsted appealed the High Court’s judgment on five grounds, namely 
the loss of opportunity for girls and boys to choose to learn and socialise 
with each other, the loss of opportunity of both boys and girls to socialise 
                                                     
6  Interim Executive Board of X School v Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of 
Education, Children's Services and Skills [2016] EWHC 2813 (Admin). 
7 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [36].  
8 Ibid [37]. 
9 Ibid [45]. 
10 Ibid [67]. 
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with each other in preparation for work and other contexts upon leaving 
school, a perceived particular detriment to girls which outweigh that to 
boys because of a perceived “minority of power” for women, and finally 
that segregation implies girls are inferior.11  
The Court of Appeal held unanimously that segregation of girl and 
boy pupils constituted direct discrimination and therefore breached s.13 or 
s.85 of the Equality Act 2010. In this case, both the girl and boy pupils 
lost out on the opportunity to socialise, interact and learn from members 
of the opposite sex.  
The approach to ascertaining less favourable treatment involved 
consideration of the individual pupil and each individual pupil faced less 
favourable treatment when compared to a pupil of the opposite sex. Thus, 
a girl pupil was held to be treated less favourably than the boy pupil and 
the boy pupil was treated less favourably than the girl pupil; both on the 
basis of their sex which is a protected characteristic under s.4 of the 
Equality Act. Thus, this breached s.85(2) of the Equality Act. Ofsted was 
therefore right to conclude that strict gender segregation resulted in a 
breach of all of the pupils’ rights.  
In overruling the High Court, the Justices held that the starting point 
for ascertaining direct discrimination under s.13 of the Equality Act is a 
“person” not a group. An individual girl pupil could not socialise and 
engage with a boy pupil because, and only because, of her sex, and vice 
versa for an individual boy pupil. Thus, each would be treated differently 
if they were of the opposite sex. Thus, a girl pupil would have the benefit 
of engaging with boy pupils if she were a boy and the only reason she 
could not in this case was because she was a girl. Therefore, even if both 
the girls and the boys were treated the same, it could still give rise to 
unlawful discrimination. Consequently, separate but equal treatment can 
still be discriminatory.12 The detriment suffered was deemed to diminish 
the quality of the pupils’ education.13 
Ofsted’s arguments that the segregation in some way reinforced ideas 
of female inferiority and male superiority in social and employment 
contexts were held to be unfounded, 2 to 1, with Gloster LJ dissenting. 14  
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Ibid [39]. 
12 Ibid [50]-[58]. 
13 Ibid [78]-[80]. 
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3 AL-HIJRAH SCHOOL’S SEGREGATION POLICY 
 
The Birmingham based Al-Hijrah school is a mixed-sex school 
operating an Islamic ethos and voluntary aided by the Local Authority. Its 
pupils are aged 4 -16, and in line with particular religious beliefs, it 
operated a complete segregation policy between its female and male 
pupils aged 9-16. The segregation remained in place for the entirety of the 
school day including lessons, breaks, clubs and trips. The underlying 
reasons given for the segregation were religious values. The Court of 
Appeal rejected this as an adequate defence or justification. The reason 
for the segregation was held to be irrelevant.15  
 
4 APPLYING THE EQUALITY ACT 2010 
 
This case raises some significant questions regarding the application 
of the provisions of section 13 and section 85 of the Equality Act 2010 to 
the charge of sex discrimination at segregated schools. The case centred 
on the question of whether there is direct discrimination where a mixed-
sex school completely segregates boys and girls over a certain age, for all 
school related activities,16 on the basis that this policy produces “adverse 
educational consequences.”17 Another key feature of this case is the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment that ascertaining discrimination from the 
perspective of each potential individual claimant was said to be the 
correct approach to interpreting the legislative provisions.  
The Equality Act protects individuals from discrimination where the 
discrimination is because of a protected characteristic. S.4 lists the 
following protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or 
belief, sex, and sexual orientation. The focus of these proceedings was 
discrimination on the grounds of sex.  
Section 11 describes the characteristic of sex as either a man or a 
woman. Section 212(1) further clarifies that the individuals can be of any 
age, thereby including children. The use of the term sex instead of gender 
specifies the biological nature of distinction.18  
                                                     
15 Ibid [81]. 
16 Ibid [1]. 
17 Ibid [2]. 
18 Bob Hepple, Equality, the Legal Framework (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon 2014) 57. 
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S.85 governs non-discrimination in the admission and treatment of 
pupils to schools. This includes a responsibility under S.85(2) to refrain 
from discrimination in the way it provides education for pupils, and in the 
way it affords access to benefits, facilities or services. The Equality Act 
operates to cover “four civil wrongs” – direct discrimination, indirect 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation. 19  The present case 
concerned direct discrimination claims due to less favourable treatment 
because of a protected characteristic leading to a detriment.  
Section13 (1) sets out that “A person (A) discriminates against 
another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less 
favourably than A treats or would treat others.” This is the test for direct 
discrimination. S.23(1) provides for a comparator, thus, the treatment of 
the claimant is to be compared with a comparator who does not share the 
claimant’s characteristic. However, “like must be compared with like”20 
and the material circumstances of the claimant and the comparator must 
be similar.21 The outcome of the treatment need not be a tangible loss.22 A 
key issue for Ofsted v Al-Hijrah was the fact that the mere deprivation of 
choice can result in a finding of less favourable treatment, 23  with a 
“detriment” being attributed to this. 
The freedom of parents to choose how their children are educated, as 
provided for under section 9 of the Education Act 1996 and the School 
Standards and Framework Act 1998, was brought into questioned. The 
Court of Appeal held that this right does not override the rights of the 
children to be educated in a manner that does not breach the Equality Act 
2010,24 and the rights enshrined therein cannot be negated by parental 
acquiescence.  
 
5 [SEGREGATION] IS “DUMB”  
 
During the inspection, Ofsted interviewed two randomly selected 
female pupils in Year 10, and asked the pupils for their opinion on the 
                                                     
19 Hepple (2014) 67. 
20 Hepple (2014) 68. 
21 Anna Beale, ‘Core Rights and Duties’ in John Wadham, Anthony Robinson, 
David Ruebain and Susie Uppal (eds) Blackstone’s Guide to the Equality Act 
2010 (3 edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 31-54, 32-33. 
22 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKHL 48, paras 52-
35. 
23  R v Birmingham City Council ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission 
[1989] AC 1155.  
24 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [82]. 
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school’s segregation policy. The response from these pupils seems to be 
an underpinning factor in the case. The inspector reported: 
 
“thinks [segregation] is ‘dumb’ because when girls go to college 
they will mix with boys, and at the moment she doesn’t know how 
to have any relationship/friendship with boys. Finds that school 
isn’t helping her get ready. Says some benefits as boys don’t 
always behave well.”25 
 
Ofsted further cited the opinions of Year 10 boys as concurring on this 
point, and also highlighted the apparent unease displayed by Year 7 
pupils, particularly that:  
 
“students clearly felt very uncomfortable about being with 
opposite sex… found it difficult to answer questions.”26  
 
This feeling of being unable to engage with the opposite sex raised 
concerns about how well these children were being socially prepared for 
“life in modern Britain”. The concern about the lack of engagement with 
each other and the resultant disadvantage were key, although not the sole, 
issues giving rise to questions about the overall standard of education 
provided by Al-Hijrah.27  
The Court of Appeal Justices demonstrated a willingness to depart 
from the usually narrow confines of less favourable treatment within the 
2010 Act to take a “wide and purposive interpretation”28  of the anti-
discrimination legislation. The Justices expanded on the definition of 
discrimination as envisaged in the Act and concluded that both “separate 
but equal” as well as “separate but different” treatment can constitute 
unlawful discrimination, and this broader definition enabled a finding of 
discrimination in this case.29 While this is to be welcomed as a general 
development in the application of the legislation, the interesting point to 
note is that the case involves a Muslim faith school which practices 
gender segregation, during a political time period where Muslim children 
and questions of integration and radicalisation are at the forefront of 
government policies. Further to this, Ofsted’s current Chief Inspector has 
                                                     
25 Ibid [15].  
26 Ibid [16]. 
27 Ibid [17]. 
28 Ibid [56]. 
29 Ibid [62]-[70]. 
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openly spoken of the idea of a “muscular liberalism” to be assumed by 
school leaders to overcome ideologies which “close minds or narrow 
opportunity”. 30  These ideological issues cannot be overlooked when 
assessing this case.  
The Court of Appeal noted that a key concern of Ofsted was “how 
well leaders were preparing pupils for life in modern Britain”, 31  and 
Ofsted’s Report stated that “[The school’s segregation policy] does not 
accord with fundamental British values and amounts to unlawful 
discrimination.”32  In particular, they stated that girls and boys cannot 
develop confident relationships with each other. Such schools are to be 
distinguished, according to Ofsted’s arguments and the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, from single sex schools which benefit from a variety of 
exceptions under Schedule 11 of the Equalities Act. 33  Thus, for the 
former, the Equality Act is being utilised to challenge and end the practice 
of segregation due to gender, while for the latter, the Equality Act protects 
against claims of discrimination where there is selected entry based on 
gender. It can undoubtedly be argued that both types of school can in fact 
produce the same outcome for the pupils where gender segregation is 
concerned, with the only distinguishing aspect being the religious nature 
of the normative influence underlying the practice. Interestingly, the 
Equality Act does refer to segregation as evidencing less favourable 
treatment, but only in the context of race under section 13(5). This is 
unsurprising given the history of South African Apartheid and North 
American race segregation. No other protected characteristic has such a 
specific special provision, although Beale 34  states that segregation on 
other grounds “could amount to less favourable treatment”, however this 
has not been confirmed by case law.  
The difference in treatment of this segregated faith school from many 
schools across Britain which are single-sex, is problematic. The Court of 
Appeal failed in this case to adequately scrutinise Ofsted’s claim that 
“British values” were being undermined. The non-statutory School 
Inspection Handbook describes the promotion of British values as: 
 
                                                     
30 Frank Cranmer, ‘Out-of-School Education, Social Cohesion and Ofsted’, (3 
February 2018), Law and Religion UK  
<http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2018/02/03/out-of-school-education-social-
cohesion-and-ofsted/>accessed 20 April 2018 
31 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [16]. 
32 Ibid [24]. 
33 Further, there are General Exceptions under Schedule 3.  
34 Beale (n 21) 33. 
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“acceptance and engagement with the fundamental British values 
of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual 
respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs; 
they develop and demonstrate skills and attitudes that will allow 
them to participate fully in and contribute positively to life in 
modern Britain.”35 
 
While it can be argued that sex-segregation can undermine expected 
“attitudes” here, this is equally the case for single-sex schools with 
protected status. So once again, the question arises of why these two 
school types are being treated differently. Furthermore, Ofsted conceded a 
number of points in their report, including that the segregation of the 
pupils did not impact on the standard of teaching the children received nor 
the range of subjects available to them. The thrust of the argument was the 
perceived detriment suffered by the children from not engaging and 
interacting with members of the opposite sex. Further to this, concerns 
were raised about pupils awareness of safeguarding issues such as forced 
marriages.36 However, the argument that this undermines British values 
seems particularly punitive.  
Ofsted has indicated that the outcome of this case will impact on its 
policy towards all state funded faith schools which operate gender 
segregation, which means a definite impact on a number of Muslim and 
Jewish faith schools,37 as well as some Christian ones.38 
 
6 SEX-SEGREGATION, SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS AND 
DETRIMENT 
  
The question of the detriment being suffered by the segregation was 
not scrutinised further by the Court of Appeal, although the issue was 
raised during the High Court hearing.39 As stated above, the arguments for 
distinguishing segregated mixed schools from single gender schools, 
                                                     
35 School Inspection Handbook 2018, 40.  
36 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [21]. 
37 A BBC News report suggested that approximately a total of 20 Jewish, Muslim 
and Christian schools are thought to have similar policies. This appears to be an 
extremely low number, however, it only includes state funded schools, not those 
privately funded. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-41609861 
(Last visited 22 January 2018). 
38  Interim Executive Board of X School v Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of 
Education, Children's Services and Skills [2016] EWHC 2813 (Admin) [11]. 
39 Ibid [95]. 
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which benefit from special exemptions under Schedule 11 of the Equality 
Act, are weak. Clearly, children at the latter schools suffer similar 
disadvantages from the lack of socialisation with members of the opposite 
sex. The decision in this case upheld Ofsted’s argument that the 
deprivation of choice in mixed schools was key. But is this a mere 
technicality, as the outcome in both settings is the same – a lack of 
engagement with members of the opposite sex? The answer to this lies in 
what is mean by “British values” and “life in modern Britain”. It is 
difficult not to question why Ofsted would take such issue with Al-Hijrah 
when Britain has a centuries old historic tradition of single-sex schools, 
which continue to exist in Modern Britain and in fact produce our political 
and judicial leaders to this day; a fact that Lady Justice Gloster makes 
mention of in her judgment.40 Indeed, all three of the esteemed Court of 
Appeal judges in this case were all educated at single-sex schools. 
The need to ensure boys and girls can respectfully and comfortably 
engage with each other is no doubt a pivotal concern in modern British 
society. However, this case leaps forward and establishes that removing 
the choice of such engagement breaches the Equality Act, presenting 
arguments which tie the highly politicised language of “British values” 
and “modern Britain” to the issue of sex discrimination, and arguably 
away from the remit intended within the School Inspection Handbook.  
It is highly likely that an inspection of any number of single-sex 
schools would reveal boys and girls equally keen to cross the fence and 
engage with the other, and who believe a single sex school is “dumb” as 
they do not get the chance to engage with the other half of the human 
race. However, it is equally likely that Ofsted or any school inspectorate 
would not ask those questions for understanding the values and traditions 
being upheld by these schools, and protected by the Schedule 11 
exemptions from section 85 provisions. It is clear that what makes Al-
Hijrah different is the religious underpinnings of the decision to 
segregate, and as a result it is difficult to separate some of the highly 
political language used in the Report from the faith based nature of the 
school.  
The Court of Appeal did not test the assumption put forward by 
Ofsted that the pupils are suffering a detriment, nor did they deal with the 
question of how much engagement would be required to overcome this 
detriment. Would shared trips or breaks be enough, or will nothing short 
of full co-education suffice? This seems to be a major oversight. There 
exist myriad of contradictory evidences testing the impact of gender 
                                                     
40 Ofsted v Al-Hijrah [126]. 
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segregated education, reflecting an overall unclear outcome. On the one 
hand, arguments can be made that single gender schools offset gendered 
roles and norms where education is concerned and undermine gender 
stereotypes. Girls, in the absence of boys, are not expected to behave “like 
girls”, and vice versa. A discussion on the potential benefits of single sex 
education follows, to question the assumption made by Ofsted that there is 
necessarily a detriment. There are equally evidences which support so-
education. However, the purpose here is not to prove which is more 
convincing, but rather to question the premise of the assumption that 
single-sex is detrimental which Ofsted argues, and which the Court of 
Appeal upheld in this case.  
Global research on single sex schools suggests differences in 
achievement are multi-layered and dependent on a multitude of other 
factors. Firstly, young children below the age of 6 and particularly 
between ages 4-6 tend to self-segregate when it comes to play, showing a 
preference to their own gender.41 This suggests that boys and girls do 
experience different peer cultures even at a young age, 42  and this 
reinforces gendered norms (boys being physically playful and girls being 
more intellectually engaged). Fabes et al concluded that the gender of 
playmates had a crucial impact on early school competence.43 The self-
segregation at this age is a natural phenomenon.  
Where single sex schools are concerned, a number of studies have 
revealed an array of possible outcomes. For example, research suggests 
that women from all girls’ schools/colleges tend to be less inhibited about 
entering traditionally male dominated fields such as the sciences. In a 
study of 1700 female college students in the US, 40-75% from single sex 
colleges shifted into neutral or male dominated fields as compared with 
25% of women in co-educational schools.44 Another study found that the 
number of female students pursuing maths and sciences dropped when the 
school became co-educational.45 As pointed out by Billger, the source of 
                                                     
41  Richard A Fabes et al, ‘Early School Competence: The Roles of Sex-
Segregated Play and Effortful Control’ (2003) 39(5) Developmental Psychology, 
848–858, 848. 
42 Fabes (2003) 849.  
43 Fabes (2003) 857. 
44 Solnick, S J, ‘Changes in Women’s Majors from Entrance to Graduation at 
Women’s and Coeducational Colleges’ (1995) 48(3) Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 505–514. 
45  Sherrilyn M Billger, ‘Admitting Men into a Women’s College: A Natural 
Experiment’ (2002) 9 Applied Economics Letters, 479–483. 
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these differences can be highly personal to the individual students, 46 
however they also seem to reflect a negative impact of sharing the 
learning environment with boys.  
Billger’s longitudinal study of single sex schooling in the US also 
revealed that “relative to co-ed schools, the gains from single-sex 
schooling may be greater for women than men, with 11% higher starting 
salaries but virtually identical salaries for men.”47 Thus, the single sex 
schools are empowering women and raising their economic expectations 
and/or achievements. On the whole, Billger found that there was a 
marginal detriment from single-sex education, but concluded that “some 
positive prospects do nonetheless arise. In some cases, African-American 
students experience unique gains, and single-sex education may therefore 
provide an important opportunity to continued improvements in 
educational quality.”48 In the UK, another longitudinal study by Sullivan, 
Joshi and Leonard49 into a cohort of single sex educated men and women 
found that at the age of 42, there was no net detrimental impact on the 
chances of being employed. Where women were concerned, there was 
however a “positive premium” of 5% on their wages as compared with 
women who were co-educated. However, this did not undermine 
occupational segregation of these women in the labour force, concluding 
that the “gendered nature of the labour market (and other) institutions is 
the dominant feature of adult experience rather than any legacy of single 
sex schooling.”50 Pertinent for the case under commentary here, Sullivan 
et al note that “It is an irony that, while the argument against single-sex 
schooling is that single-sex environments are ‘unnatural’ for young 
people, gender segregated environments are seen as quite normal in adult 
life.”51 Thus, Ofsted’s arguments of British values and modern Britain 
perhaps bely a lack of contextual awareness, and perhaps a utopian vision 
of sex-equality in modern Britain being imposed on a school, while failing 
to take account of the reality of norms in modern Britain.  
                                                     
46 Sherrilyn M Billger, ‘On Reconstructing School Segregation: The Efficacy and 
Equity of Single-sex Schooling’ (2009) 28 Economics of Education Review, 393-
402, 393-394.  
47 Billger (2009) 395, 400. 
48 Billger (2009) 402. 
49 Alice Sullivan, Heather Joshi and Diana Leonard, ‘Single-sex Schooling and 
Labour Market Outcomes’ (June 2011) 37(3) Oxford Review of Education, 311–
332. 
50 Ibid 329. 
51 Sullivan et al (n 49) 329.  
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It is interesting that where male students are concerned, Billger found 
that those who had attended single-sex schools were less likely to pursue 
science and computers. Perhaps an indication of the lack of expectations 
imposed on “masculine” subjects in the absence of female students. On 
the other hand, the male students pursued “business, philosophy/religion, 
engineering and secretarial skills.”52 This outcome of single-sex education 
should perhaps be a coercive factor where gender equality is concerned. 
Burton argues that the one main reason why gender inequality persists 
despite the 2010 Act, and its predecessor legislations, is the issue of 
occupational segregation which is the tendency for men and women to be 
employed in different occupations.53 If single-sex schooling breaks down 
gendered norms where career choices are concerned, the overall impact 
for gender equality is, surely, positive. Thus, even in the case where short 
term disadvantage may be identified through the removal of a choice to 
engage with members of the opposite sex, perhaps the long term gain 
outweighs any detriment? 
Sex discrimination and stereotypes go hand in hand. Kelsey argues 
that in the US context, sex segregated schools are unconstitutional as the 
14th amendment guarantees against sex discrimination, and he argued that 
segregated schools perpetuate stereotypes about how each gender should 
behave. 54  He breaks down this argument at the physiological and 
biological levels. On the other hand, he cites programmes which seek to 
enhance the performance of female students in subjects where boys 
traditionally outperform them such as Mathematics. These “single-sex 
programs seek to bolster girls’ confidence and interest in math by 
providing an environment where boys are unable to dominate.”55 While 
Kelsey critiques the positive exam results as possibly influenced by the 
selection programme for female students undertaking the course, it is 
clear that the environment to some extent plays a part in increasing the 
students’ achievements. In the US, single-sex education is a highly 
political issue.56 Elsewhere, Edstrom and Brunila studied gender equality 
work in Sweden and Finland, and discovered an alliance between 
                                                     
52 Billger (n 45) 398.  
53  Becci Burton, ‘Neoliberalism and the Equality Act 2010: A Missed 
Opportunity for Gender Justice?’ (July 2014) 43(2) Industrial Law Journal 122, 
132.  
54 Chapple Kelsey, ‘Sports for Boys, Wedding Cakes for Girls: The Inevitability 
of Stereotyping in Schools Segregated by Sex’ (2016) 9 Texas Law Review 537. 
55 Ibid 544.  
56 Nancy Chi Cantalupo, ‘Comparing Single-Sex and Reformed Coeducation: A 
Constitutional Analysis’ (2012) 49 San Diego Law Review 725.  
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projectisation and heteronormativity.57 A binary construction of boys and 
girls was identified and the focus on school children revealed the 
existence of gender stereotypes in co-educational settings, before gender 
equality awareness is raised. At the point of awareness, “the girls’ group 
is encouraged to be stronger, braver, more independent and to take more 
space, while the boys’ group is encouraged to be more socially and 
linguistically competent.”58 They found that the girls’ group is required to 
change its behavior more than the boys group, placing more pressure on 
girls. Other factors which have impact for girls of a certain age may be 
female role models.59  
This analysis weaves a complex picture of the possible outcomes of 
sex-segregated schooling. In Ofsted v Al-Hijrah, the Court of Appeal held 
that a harm was suffered by each individual girl and boy pupil. But this 
decision was reached without adequately testing that harm. Only a small 
number of pupils are cited in the Ofsted report, raising the question of 
disparate impact. Zatz’s “disparate impact liability” theory may be of 
interest here.60 While the focus is on employment discrimination law in 
the US, the 2010 Act provides comparable anti-discrimination provisions 
for England and Wales. Here, group outcomes are viewed collectively and 
not all members of the group are expected to suffer. Similarly, in the case 
of the pregnant women, “the fact that some women who are pregnant or 
on maternity leave have not been treated unfavourably does not mean that 
this particular woman’s unfavourable treatment is not because of her 
pregnancy or maternity leave.”61 The matter must be viewed from the 
perspective of the individual claimant. In the Case of Al-Hijrah students, 
the court of Appeal did not require a single claimant pupil to be identified. 
However, perhaps identifying such a pupil, even anonymously, would 
have strengthened Ofsted’s arguments of a detriment being suffered.  
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7 APPEAL 
 
In November 2017, the Association of Muslim Schools (AMS) made 
an application for addition of a party after the conclusion of an appeal,62 
in the hope of appealing the decision to the Supreme Court. AMS’ 
concerns were focussed around their 133 membership schools, 10 of 
whom implemented the same segregation policies as Al-Hijrah, and others 
segregated girls and boys for certain activities. AMS submitted that the 
Court of Appeal ruling had created uncertainty on what was expected of 
the schools, and they wished to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. 
AMS can be classed as the relevant diocesan authority for any state 
funded Muslim school in accordance with the Education Act and therefore 
should be consulted in any change to admissions criteria for Muslim 
schools. Further to this, AMS also conducts its own inspections of its 
membership schools pursuant to s 48 of the Education Act 2005. This 
application to the Court was made pursuant to these interests and 
clarification from the Supreme Court was being sought on the basis that 
the Appeal Court ruling had created uncertainty on the standard to which 
these schools would be held upon inspection, and AMS’s own statutory 
obligations when inspecting schools. In particular, they cited the “lack of 
guidance from Ofsted or the Department for Education on the question of 
segregation. There has been no public consultation and no official 
statement that educating girls and boys separately is fundamentally 
wrong.”63 
In rejecting the appeal, the court cited a lack of detail in the witness 
statement provided by AMS, including names of the schools potentially 
affected and the segregation policies which they adopt. An issue which 
comes down to a badly drafted application rather than a legitimate lack of 
concern. It seems clear that the question of wider applicability of this 
decision which was purported to only be relevant to the particular Ofsted 
report relating to Al-Hijrah School, is a legitimate one. The Appeal Court 
admitted their “judgments touch on matters of general application”64 and 
also noted that the decision reached in this case will lead Ofsted to 
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applying a “consistent approach to all similarly organised schools.”65 The 
Justices cited the acceptance of the decision by Al-Hijrah School and 
Birmingham City Council and moves to implement the decision as an 
indication that the matter was resolved. This seems clearly erroneous in 
light of AMS’s appeal that several other schools operate the same policy 
and will no doubt be held to the same standard. For this to be clarified, 
and for this potentially divisive ruling to be legitimately employed by 
Ofsted at other schools, there seems to be a clear need for a Supreme 
Court judgment which may confirm the Appeal Court’s decision, but 
place clear parameters of expected engagement between the pupils to 
overcome any detriment suffered. While Al-Hijrah did not wish to appeal, 
neither did they oppose AMS’s endeavours to appeal.66  
 
8 CONCLUSION  
 
The decision reached by the Court of Appeal in Ofsted v Al-Hijrah 
was criticised by Colin Diamond, corporate director of children and 
young people at Birmingham City Council, on the basis that Al-Hijrah 
School were purportedly being held to a higher standard by Ofsted, while 
other schools with similar policies were being allowed to continue as 
usual.67 During a BBC Radio 4 interview, he questioned Ofsted’s logic in 
allowing a boys’ school and a girls’ school to operate adjacent to each 
other, with a fence between them, without difficulties; while 
simultaneously taking particular issue with boys and girls in the same 
school, questioning the logic and equity being applied. These are valid 
points.  
Where sex discrimination, in the context of single-sex education, this 
case raises many questions about the application of the 2010 Act. Al-
Hijrah purported to be a co-educational school which segregated boys and 
girls, thereby removing from the pupils the choice of engaging with 
members of the opposite sex and thereby resulting in a detriment being 
suffered. However, the Ofsted report following a s 5 inspection of Al-
Hijrah made reference to politicised terms such as “British values” and 
“life in modern Britain”, without adequate scrutiny. When the present 
legal treatment of segregated co-educational schooling is contrasted with 
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the long established British tradition of single-sex schools, there is a 
glaring disparity. The latter is protected from discrimination claims by the 
very same Act seemingly being breached by the segregated school. 
Despite the technical distinction between the two types of schools, which 
mean one has the possibility of engagement with the opposite sex, while 
the other does not, claims of detriment are also inadequately scrutinised 
by the Appeal Court and evidence abound of the lack of clarity in 
outcome for those educated in single-sex schools contrasted with co-
educational settings.  
Finally, the grounds on which AMS was precluded from joining the 
action and appealing the case to the Supreme Court are unpersuasive, and 
the resultant position is that faith schools exercising gender segregation 
can now all expect a visit from Ofsted. How these schools reorganise 
themselves is yet to be determined, but it is clear that the only way they 
can continue with single-sex education, if they so wish, is to operate two 
separate schools, one for boys and one for girls.  
